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A major open problem in the theory of multi-prover interactive proofs
is to characterize the languages which can be accepted by fully
parallelized multi-prover protocols with an exponentially low proba-
bility of cheating. In this paper we solve this problem by proving that
any language which can be accepted by a sequential multi-prover
protocol can also be accepted by a single-round multi-party protocol,
and thus the multi-prover round hierarchy collapses to its first level:
MIP(poly)=MIP(1)=NEXP-time. ] 1997 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
We say that a language L has a multi-prover interactive
proof if there exists an interactive BPP verifier V capable of
interacting with several computationally unbounded
provers P1 } } } Pc whose goal is to convince V that a com-
mon input x belongs to L. The provers can cooperate and
choose a common strategy before the interaction with the
verifier starts, but they are isolated from each other during
the execution of the protocol; namely, they are not allowed
to communicate with each other and each one of them can-
not see the messages which are exchanged between the
verifier and the other provers. The verifier follows a
prespecified protocol and when it ends, he evaluates a
predicate (on his random bits and on the sequence of
queries and responses he received), according to which he
either accepts or rejects the claim ‘‘x # L.’’ In order to be a
multi-prover interactive proof, the protocol has to satisfy
the following conditions:
1. Completeness. _P1 } } } Pc , \x # L, V accepts x with
probability 1.
2. Soundness. \P1 } } } Pc , \x  L, the probability that V
accepts x is at most 2&|x| (where |x| is the size of the
common input x).
Note that in this definition the number of provers c is a
constant which does not depend on the input x.
Any multi-prover interactive proof can be considered as
being divided into time steps: In each step either the verifier
sends his queries to the provers (the verifier’s step) or they
send him their responses (the provers’ step). Without loss of
generality, we can assume that the first step (in any interac-
tive proof) is that of V, and we define a round as a pair of
consecutive steps: A verifier’s step followed by a prover’s
step. We denote by MIP(r) the class of all languages which
can be accepted by r-round multi-prover interactive proofs,
and by MIP(poly) the case in which r is bounded by some
polynomial in |x|.
Since Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR] and
Babai [B] introduced the notion of interactive proofs, and
Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, and Wigderson [BGKW]
suggested the multi-prover model, two interesting questions
have been raised:
1. What are the languages which can be accepted by
interactive proofs?
2. What are the languages which can be accepted by
multi-prover interactive proofs?
A complete answer for the first question was given by
Lund, Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [LFKN] and Shamir
[Sh]. They proved that PSPACE is exactly the class of all
languages which can be accepted by interactive proofs.
Then, Babai, Fortnow, and Lund [BFL] characterized the
class MIP(poly) of all languages which have sequential
multi-prover protocols (with polynomially many rounds)
by proving that this class is exactly NEXP-time.
One of the famous open problems in this area is whether
such sequential multi-prover interactive proofs can be fully
parallelized, namely, whether they can be transformed into
protocols which require just a single round and a constant
number of provers and still have an exponentially low
probability of cheating. Many papers were devoted to this
problem, achieving various partial results.
Cai, Condon, and Lipton proved in [CCL] that every
language in PSPACE (and thus, every language which has
a single prover protocol) can be accepted by a two-prover
one-round interactive proof. They proved it by showing
how to parallelize the single prover PSPACE protocol of
Shamir [Sh] by adding a second prover. Kilian proved in
[Ki] that anything provable by two provers can be proven
article no. SS971238
215 0022-000097 25.00
Copyright  1997 by Academic Press
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
File: 571J 123802 . By:CV . Date:01:04:97 . Time:12:55 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 6191 Signs: 5059 . Length: 56 pic 0 pts, 236 mm
in a constant number of rounds, but achieving only a con-
stant probability of cheating. Independently, Feige proved
in [Fe] that NEXP-time languages have one-round two-
prover protocols with 12+= probability of cheating. So far,
no one was able to reduce the probability of cheating below
a constant.
Our result in this paper is that the sequential [BFL]
protocol can be fully parallelized into a single round protocol
that has an exponentially low probability of cheating, and
thus the multi-prover round hierarchy collapses to its first
level: MIP(poly)=MIP(1)=NEXP-time.
We introduce the new concept of a quasi-oracle, on which
our analysis is based. The quasi-oracle is a slightly weaker
version of the usual consistent oracle. We show that such a
quasi-oracle can be implemented by a one-round two-
prover protocol, and that it implies that MIP(poly)=
MIP(1).
The paper is organized in the following way: In the next
section we briefly review the sequential [BFL] protocol for
NEXP-time and the method developed by Cai, Condon,
and Lipton [CCL] for parallelizing sequential single prover
protocols. In Section 3 we describe our parallel protocol,
which is based on the quasi-oracle approach introduced in
Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to proving its soundness.
2. A REVIEW OF THE [BFL] TWO-PROVER SEQUENTIAL
PROTOCOL FOR NEXP-TIME
2.1. Introduction to NEXP-time Protocols
Let L be a language accepted by a non-deterministic
exponential time Turing Machine M and consider the
3-CNF formula 8X which represents the computation of M
on some input X # L ( |X|=k). It contains exponentially
many variables and exponentially many clauses, but it is
polynomially definable. Namely, there exists a polynomially
computable function which on input l1 outputs the con-
tents of the l th clause in the 3-CNF formula 8X . Let 2n be
the total number of variables. Consider an assignment of
boolean values to all variables as an arithmetic function
from the set of n-bit indices J=[0, 1]n (of all variables) to
[0, 1]. Since any boolean function can be extended into a
unique multilinear function over a larger ring, we can
extend the domain from J to In, where I=[0, ..., N&1] (for
some large integer N>2n), defining a new function
A : I n  Z as a multilinear extension of the original boolean
function. Namely, A is multilinear and it is identical to the
original boolean function over J. We say that A : In  Z
satisfies a 3-CNF formula if A|J consists of 01 values which
satisfy this formula. The following Lemma was proved by
Babai, Fortnow, and Lund in [BFL].
Lemma 1. For any such M, X, 8X , there exists a poly-
nomial QX in nO(1) variables such that:
1. An arithmetic expression for QX of degree nO(1) is
computable in nO(1) time from X.
2. A function A : I n  Z satisfies the formula 8X iff
: QX (z, b1 , b2 , b3 , A(b1), A(b2) , A(b3))=0,
where the summation extends over all possible 01 substi-
tutions to the variables (z # [0, 1]nO(1), bj # J).
2.2. The [BFL] Protocol
Given a common input X # [0, 1]k, the two infinitely
powerful provers (P1 , P2) wish to prove to a random poly-
nomial time verifier V that X # L. Basically the [BFL]
protocol consists of three parts:
1. Multilinearity test. In this part V infers with
exponentially high confidence that a certain function A
which the provers use is approximately multilinear.
Namely, there exists a multilinear function which is identi-
cal to A on all but a small fraction of the domain. This test
is carried out by sending polynomially many random inputs
from each one of polynomially many random lines in the
domain In to P1 , and receiving his answers about the A
values of these points. The verifier then checks that along
each line, the answers are linear and bounded by B=2nc for
some constant c (for details see [BFL]).
2. Satisfiability test. Using the protocol of Lund,
Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [LFKN] and Shamir [Sh]
the verifier checks that
: QX (z, b1 , b2 , b3 , A(b1), A(b2), A(b3))=0
by successively eliminating all the summation symbols,
where z, b1 , b2 , b3 #R I n are randomly chosen by V.
3. The final substitution. When all summation symbols
are eliminated, the verifier substitutes the values A(b1),
A(b2), A(b3)<B (which he receives from P1) into the
known polynomial QX in order to check its claimed value.
P2 is asked just a single query: either from the first part
(the multilinearity test), or from the third part (the values of
A(b1), A(b2), or A(b3)). V checks that P1 and P2 provide the
same answer for the common query. This basic protocol is
executed sequentially polynomially many times. Babai,
Fortnow, and Lund have shown in [BFL] that if the above
function is indeed approximately multilinear, then the prob-
ability of cheating in the satisfiability test is exponentially
small (due to the soundness of the [LFKN, Sh] protocol).
Note that in each sequential round P2 either receives no
query or obtains a single query. Therefore in each sequential
round of the [BFL] protocol, P2 can be considered as a
deterministic oracle for some function. Consider now just
the part of the protocol between V and P2 . This subprotocol
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can be thought of as sampling polynomially many random
queries among those which are directed at P1 and sending
them to polynomially many independent oracles. Each
oracle (P2 at each sequential round) is asked just about one
of them, so that V receives many independent answers
which can be compared against those provided by P1 for the
same queries.
2.3. The Parallelization Problem
Cai, Condon, and Lipton developed in [CCL] a general
methodology for parallelizing certain protocols, which
include Shamir’s single prover sequential protocol for
PSPACE. The parallelized PSPACE protocol requires a
second prover and is executed in one round as follows: One
of the provers receives in one message all the queries which
the verifier sends in Shamir’s sequential protocol, while the
other prover receives a random length prefix of this
sequence. The verifier checks the answers of the first prover
as the sequential verifier does, but also checks the con-
sistency of the answers of the two provers in the common
prefix. This basic protocol is carried out polynomially many
times in parallel. The reason why the probability of cheating
decreases exponentially fast is the following: In each parallel
round, the first prover sends a sequence of r (low degree)
polynomials as responses to r random values in some large
field. The second prover receives the first 1l&1r ran-
dom values and replies with the first l polynomials. If the
actual statement (proven in the protocol) is false but the
proof is accepted, there must be 1ir such that the i th
polynomial in the sequence sent by the first prover is
incorrect and the next one is correct (for details, see [Sh]).
Therefore the same interpolation argument as that in
[LFKN, Sh] implies that if the choice of l is equal to this
i, then with overwhelming probability (due to the ratio
between the degree of the polynomials and the size of
the field) the verifier will catch the provers in one of the
following cases: Either the polynomial sequence sent by the
first prover is incorrect (with respect to V ’s queries) or the
lth polynomial sent by the second prover is different from
that of the first prover. The probability that l=i is 1r and,
thus, if this basic protocol is carried out in parallel r2 inde-
pendent executions, then with overwhelming probability
there exists a parallel execution for which i=l, and this par-
ticular execution by itself suffices to make the probability of
cheating exponentially low (for details, see [CCL]).
The proof technique used in the satisfiability test (in the
[BFL] protocol) is exactly the same as that used in the
protocols of Lund, Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [LFKN]
and Shamir [Sh]. Therefore, the parallelization technique
of Cai, Condon, and Lipton (which was developed in
[CCL] for parallelizing such protocols) can also be applied
to the satisfiability test (the second part) in the [BFL]
protocol. The sole problem is how to parallelize the multi-
linearity test, namely, how can it be executed in a single
round. Consider now the following naive parallel version
(P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , V) of the [BFL] protocol: P 1 receives in one
message all queries which would be send to the first prover
in the sequential [BFL] protocol, and he answers them
exactly as the original sequential prover does. V checks the
responses exactly as the sequential verifier would do. Now,
we apply the technique of Cai, Condon, and Lipton [CCL]
to the satisfiability test: P 2 receives a random length prefix
of the satisfiability test and provides the same answers given
by P 1 . V checks the consistency of the responses sent by P 1
and P 2 . This basic protocol is carried out m=poly(n) times
in parallel. P 3 receives in parallel, m queries x1 , ..., xm , a ran-
domly chosen member from each parallel set of queries for
the multilinear function (either from the multilinearity test,
carried out by P 1 and V or from the final triplet of queries).
P 3 provides the same answers as those of P 1 (on the com-
mon queries). V checks that indeed P 1 and P 3 provide the
same responses for the common queries.
This naive approach fails since P 3 receives in this single-
round protocol many queries for the multilinear function,
and thus he cannot be considered as an oracle for each such
query. Assume, for example, that this protocol is executed
twice, where in the first execution P3 receives in parallel the
pair of queries (a1 , a2) and in the other execution he receives
(a1 , a$2), where a2{a$2 . P 3 may reply with (b1 , b2) in the first
execution and (b$1 , b$2) in the second one, where b1{b$1 , and
thus V receives two different answers for the same question
a1 , without being able to catch the prover. This contrasts
the situation in the sequential [BFL] protocol, in which the
second sequential prover receives a single query in each
round, and thus implements some oracle in each round.1
Now, consider a single round protocol which is executed by
V and m+2 independent provers: P$, P", P1 , ..., Pm . The
roles of P$ and P" are exactly the same as those of P 1 and
P 2 in the above naive protocol, but P 3 is replaced by m inde-
pendent provers P1 , ..., Pm : Instead of sending all m random
queries x1 , ..., xm to a single prover P 3 , V now distributes
them among the provers P1 , ..., Pm . Namely, for each
1im, V challenges Pi just with xi . Since each of these
independent provers Pi receives a single query and cannot
see that queries directed at the other provers, V obtains m
independent answers, and each of these provers can be con-
sidered as a consistent oracle that anwers queries according
to some prespecified function fPi (which depends just on his
internal tapes that are specified before the protocol starts).
In fact, the second prover in the sequential [BFL] protocol
implements such m oracles (in each sequential round he
plays the role of a different oracle). Therefore, if we could
implement such m oracles by a single round protocol
involving only a constant number (rather than m=poly(n))
of provers, we are done. Indeed, in the remaining sections
1 The fact that this oracle may vary from round to round is irrelevant in
the proof of soundness; see the details in [BFL].
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we show how two provers can implement such m oracles in
one round.
3. A PARALLEL PROTOCOL FOR NEXP-TIME
In this section we describe our four prover single round
protocol for NEXP-time. P1 receives in a single message all
the queries which are directed at the first prover in the
sequential [BFL] protocol, namely, the queries of the mul-
tilinearity test (vectors in I n), the queries of the satisfiability
test, and the triplet b1 , b2 , b3 #R I n. P1 should reply with the
same answers as those of the sequential prover, and V
checks P1’s replies in the usual way. We now apply the
technique of Cai, Condon, and Lipton [CCL] to the
satisfiability test: V sends to P2 a random length prefix of
the satisfiability queries (which are sent to P1). P2 should
reply with the same answers as those of P1 on the common
queries. This basic protocol is carried out m times in
parallel, where m=poly(n) (for some polynomial poly(n)).
V accepts this part of the protocol iff all of these m basic
protocols succeed. V accepts the entire interactive proof iff
he accepts both the above part and the second part which is
the new protocol (P3 , P4 , V) described in the next subsec-
tion. The purpose of this new protocol is to force the provers
to behave as a consistent oracle which answers each query
x by the same value A(x) regardless of the other queries
x$, x", ... which are asked in parallel to x.
3.1. The Oraclization Protocol
The participants of the following one-round protocol are
two independent provers P3 , P4 and the random polyno-
mial time verifier V. V randomly and independently chooses
a single query (a vector in In) from each one of the m
parallel sets of queries for the multilinear function, which V
asks P1 . Namely, each one of these m queries, is chosen
either from the multilinearity test or from the final triplet of
queries. Note that the queries along each line in the multi-
linearity tests are not pairwise independent, but since V
chooses only one query from each parallel set, he obtains m
random and independent vectors x1 , ..., xm # I n. From now
on, all the computations are carried out over the finite field
Zp , for an arbitrary prime p>B.
V randomly and independently chooses m new vectors
y1 , ..., ym # Znp . If there exists 1im for which xi, 1=yi, 1
then V sends nothing to P3 , P4 , accepts the execution, and
halts. Since this event has exponentially small probability
(1p<12n) we can ignore its negligible effect and deal just
with the case where for each 1im, xi and yi differ on
their first coordinate (i.e., xi, 1{yi, 1). Then for each
2 jn, consider the j th coordinate xi, j (yi, j , respectively)
as a linear function of the first coordinate xi, 1 ( yi, 1). More
precisely, we define for each i, a linear function over
Zp : li, j (x)=ai, jx+bi, j , whose value is xi, j at x=xi, 1 , and
yi, j at x=yi, 1 . Therefore for each 1im, the choices of xi
and yi define a sequence of linear functions, Li (x)=
(li, 2(x), ..., li, n(x)).
Due to the linear relations (Li) between the coordinates
of each of the vectors xi , yi we can consider the multilinear
function A(u1 , ..., un),2 when (u1 , ..., un) # Li , as a single
variable polynomial qi # Zp[x] of degree at most n in the
variable u1 . V sends y1 , ..., ym to P4 who replies with the
multilinear values A( y1), ..., A( ym). V sends x1 , ..., xm and
L1 , ..., Lm (as linear functions, without revealing the points
yi’s which, together with xi’s, defined them) to P3 , and
receives from him A(x1), ..., A(xm) and the polynomials
q1 , ..., qm . Now, for each 1im, V checks that:
1. P3’s replies are identical to those of P1 on the com-
mon queries (xi’s)
2. qi is a polynomial of degree bounded by n in Zp[x]
3. qi ( yi, 1)=P4( yi)
4. qi (xi, 1)=P3(xi).
Where Pi (z) denotes the value provided by Pi as a
response to z. If this is the case then V accepts; otherwise he
rejects and halts. As proven in Section 5, acceptance implies
that P3 behaves as a weak oracle whose answers (on the
xi’s) usually depend on the input but not on its context. We
formalize this notion in the next section.
4. QUASI-ORACLES
In our protocol, P3 obtains m=poly(n) simultaneous
questions, and our goal is to prove that he either answers
each one of the xi’s independently of the other xj , j{i, or is
caught by V as a cheater with overwhelming probability.
This natural requirement is captured by the new formal
notion of quasi-oracles.
Definition 2 (A quasi-oracle). A protocol (P3 , P4 , V)
of the type described in Section 3 is a quasi-oracle if there
exists a family
F=[ fy], y # [(Znp)
m],
where each fy is a vector of functions ( fy, 1 , ..., fy, m)
such that: Pr[P3(x1 , ..., xm)=( fy, 1(x1), ..., fy, m(xm)) or V
rejects]1&120(n), where:
1. P3(x1 , ..., xm) denotes the vector of m values provided
by P3 as responses for the m queries (x1 , ..., xm).
2. The probabily space is the uniform distribution over
the vectors of queries x # (In)m sent to P3 and the vectors of
queries y # (Znp)
m sent to P4 .
Remarks. 1. To be an oracle, a prover must answer the
parallel queries by applying some function f to each one of
2 The function according to which P1 should reply.
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them separately. To be a quasi-oracle, we give P3 an extra
degree of freedom: the function f is allowed to depend (from
V ’s point of view) on the queries directed at P4 . This seems
to be essential since we do not know how to construct a one-
round protocol which can force P3 to use the same f in all
possible scenarios. As shown later in this paper, this extra
degree of freedom has no effect on the correctness of the
whole NEXP-time protocol.
2. The usual definition of an oracle requires that P3
answers all the possible parallel queries in a consistent way.
Again, we do not know how to achieve such a strong condi-
tion and replace it by a weaker condition of consistency for
most random choices of x.
3. We do not specify the queries Li directed at P3 since
they are uniquely defined by x and y.
4. In the proof of soundness, rejection of fraudulent
provers is a desirable outcome and thus we do not care to
separate between the probability of consistent behavior and
of failure. The only behavior we want to exclude is an incon-
sistent behavvior which is not caught by V.
The technique used in the sequential [BFL] protocol, is
to give the second prover one random query xi (1im)
from those given to the first prover in the i th stage and to
check the consistency of the answers. The vector of queries
(x1 , ..., xm) is thus randomly chosen with uniform distribu-
tion from (In)m.
If, in addition to our parallel (P1 , P2 , V) subprotocol, we
have a quasi-oracle (P3 , P4 , V) with a corresponding family
F of functions, then the (parallelized) verifier randomly
chooses fy=( fy, 1 , ..., fy, m) # R F and for every 1im
compares
P1(xi) =
? Si (P3(x1 , ..., xm)),
where P1(xi) denotes the value provided by P1 as an answer
for xi and Si is the selector function which returns the i th of
the m values in P3’s answer. With overwhelming proba-
bility, V either accepts the right-hand side which is equal to
fy, i (xi) or rejects (according to Definition 2). Therefore,
with exponentially high probability, the parallel verifier
either rejects or compares P1’s answers with the replies of m
oracles giving the fy, i’s values, and thus the oracles
implemented (by the second prover) in the sequential
[BFL] protocol can be replaced by a quasi-oracle,
achieving a single-round four-prover protocol for NEXP-
time.
5. THE SOUNDNESS OF THE PARALLEL
ORACLIZATION PROTOCOL
Theorem 3. The protocol (P3 , P4 , V) (defined in Sub-
section 3.1) is a quasi-oracle.
Proof. For each 1im, we define the following ‘‘suc-
cess matrix’’ Mi : The names of the rows are all the possible
choices of y=( y1 , ..., ym) # (Znp)
m, and the names of the
columns are all the possible choices of x=(x1 , ..., xm) #
(In)m. As noted above, for each entry the queries L1 , ..., Lm
directed at P3 are totally determined by the names of the
corresponding row and column. An entry is equal to one iff
Si (P3(x1, ..., xm)), Si (P4( y1, ..., ym)), and Si (P3(L1, ..., Lm))
(which are defined by this entry) are accepted by V (then we
say that V accepts Si (P3(x1 , ..., xm))); otherwise it is zero.
For the sake of convenience, we reorganize the columns of
Mi in the following order: The v’s block of columns consists
of all the columns whose names are in In_, ..., _I n_v_
In_, ...,_I n, i.e., those whose i th coordinate is the value v
and whose other coordinates range over all the possible
values.
Each choice of row y=( y1 , ..., ym) in Mi defines a func-
tion Ay, i in the following way: For each possible value of xi
consider the corresponding block of columns, rank the
accepted values of Si (P3(x1 , ..., xm)) into decreasing order
of popularity, and define Ay, i (xi) as the best accepted value
(ties can be broken lexicographically).
For example, if for the particular value v of the ith query,
P3 provides in 1000 contexts the value 5 (900 of which are
rejected by V) and provides in 200 contexts the value 7 (50
of which are rejected by V) among all the parallel queries
defining the y th row and vth block, then Ay, i (v)=7.
Since V randomly chooses y=( y1 , ..., ym), he chooses a
random row in the matrix to which we associate a function
Ay=(Ay, 1 , ..., Ay, m). Our goal now is to prove that our two-
prover one-round protocol is a quasi-oracle with respect to
this family A of functions, and thus when V chooses a
random function Ay # R A, and a random parallel query
(x1 , ..., xm) #R(I n)m, with overwhelming probability he
either accepts the correct Ay, i values or rejects the execution.
Let *s denote the number of occurrences of the s-most
frequently accepted answer for xi in the particular block and
row of the matrix Mi and denote by W the number of
columns in that block.
The following lemma formally states that V is very
unlikely to accept any value other than the most popular
one.
Lemma 4. For every 1im and for every value v of xi ,
the fraction of rows in the block of columns in Mi associated




is less than 12n4.
Proof. Fix 1im and consider just the block of Mi
associated with v. We now divide the rows (whose names
satisfy yi, 1{v1) of this block of columns, into disjoint
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blocks of rows such that in each block of rows, all the yj ,
j{i, are fixed, and all the yi’s belong to a common Li to
which v belongs. Thus each block of rows consists of exactly
p&1 rows, and every two blocks of rows are disjoint since
v is the single intersection point of the two corresponding
lines Li’s. Note that P3 (who receives the queries x and the
lines Li’s) knows nothing about the actual choice of yi, 1 .
Now, we prove the lemma separately for each block of rows
within the vth block of columns.
Due to the common Li (on which all the yi’s and the v lie)
and the common yj’s ( j{i), once we fix a column, the
queries Li’s are determined; namely, they depend just on the
column. Moreover, if V accepts two different replies of P3 on
v in two executions sharing the same y (which necessarily
correspond to two different degrees of popularity s${s")
then V receives two different polynomials (as answers to Li)
q${q" of degree bounded by n.
Assume that (1) is true for at least a fraction 12n4 of the
rows in the block of rows. Consider the probability distribu-
tion defind by randomly choosing one row and two columns
in this block, which define two executions sharing the same
y queries. The two columns define two polynomials q$, q" of
degrees bounded by n in Zp[x] (provided by P3 as answers
to Li). We derive a contradiction by trying to compute the
probability of the event
E=‘‘q${q" and V accepts both executions’’
in two different ways. An easy upper bound can be obtained
via:
Pr[E]Pr[V accepts both executions | q${q"]
Pr[q$( yi, 1)=q"( yi, 1) | q${q"]np,
since the non-zero n th degree polynomial (q$&q") can have
at most n possible zeroes in the field Zp .
The computation of the lower bound is divided into two
cases: In the first case, at least half of the rows in the block















which is larger then np for p2n, leading to a contra-
diction. In the second case, at least half of the rows in the
block which satisfy (1) also satisfy
*1W2n4. (3)
Then for each s>1, *s*1W2n4, but the sum of all
these *s is much higher (>W2n5) and thus for each row
which satisfies (1) and (3), there is a partition of the set of
the s-entries3 for s2, into two disjoint parts, each of which








V \ 13 V 2n5+
2
which is also larger than np. Again, we obtain a contra-
diction and the desired result follows immediately. K
Since m=poly(n) we can combine these results for all the
Mi (1im) and complete the proof of Theorem 3. K
This yields the main theorem.
Theorem 5. The protocol (P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 , V) is a fully
parallelized multi-prover protocol for NEXP-time, and
thus the round hierarchy of multi-prover interactive proofs
collapses to its first level:
MIP(poly)=MIP(1)=NEXP-time.
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